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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Joey Edward Hall appeals from the district court's order revoking his 
probation claiming (1) the district court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into 
his request for substitute counsel and in failing to appoint substitute counsel; and 
(2) the district court abused its discretion by denying Rule 35 relief after revoking 
Hall's probation. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Hall with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.18-
19, 43-44.) Hall's case was eventually transferred to drug court and the court 
entered a withheld judgment and order of probation. (R., pp.81, 84-86.) Less 
than two months later, on August 21, 2008, the court ordered Hall to serve six 
days on the Sheriff's Work Detail as a result of Hall's violation of the rules of Drug 
Court. (R., p.90.) Just shy of two months after that, the court again ordered Hall 
to serve 2 days on the Sheriff's Work Detail for again violating the rules of Drug 
Court. (R., p.92.) Seven months later, the court ordered Hall to serve three days 
in jail due to another violation. (R., p.99.) Hall was subsequently arrested on a 
"Drug Court Bench Warrant" (R., p.101) after which the state filed a motion to 
revoke Hall's probation based on a number of violations, including an allegation 
that Hall was "terminated from Drug Court" on October 28, 2009 (R., pp.112-
122). 
On December 10, 2009, approximately three weeks after the state filed its 
motion to revoke probation, an order was entered expelling Hall from Drug Court. 
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(R., p.134.) Hall admitted he violated his probation by being "terminated from 
Drug Court due to his continued drug and alcohol consumption and non-
compliance" and the state dismissed four additional allegations. (R., pp.117, 
146.) 
Three months after admitting he violated his probation, but prior to 
disposition, Hall filed a motion to withdraw that admission on the grounds that 
"the probation violation was filed [sic] prematurely." (R., p.154.) The court 
conducted a hearing on Hall's motion after which it allowed Hall to withdraw his 
admission to violating his probation, and the court scheduled an evidentiary 
hearing. (R., p.161.) 
Following the probation violation evidentiary hearing, the court found Hall 
violated three conditions of his probation. (R., pp.163-165.) Consistent with the 
state's recommendation, the court revoked Hall's probation and entered 
judgment, imposing a unified five-year sentence with two years fixed, but 
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.176, 179-180.) The court subsequently placed Hall 
on probation. (R., pp.184-196.) 
Less than one month after the court gave Hall his second chance on 
probation, the state filed a motion to revoke his probation. (R., pp.201-207.) At 
the evidentiary hearing on the alleged probation violations, Hall requested the 
appointment of new counsel. (R., p.242; 3/9/2011 Tr., p.5. Ls.9-11.) The basis 
for Hall's request was a claim he was not satisfied with counsel because she had 
not made any "attempt to come and see [him] to discuss [his] case," had "failed 
to put in a couple of different motions [he] asked for," would not "answer [his] 
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calls," and had "not collected any of the evidence [he] asked her to." (3/9/2011 
Tr., p.5, Ls.12-17.) After further colloquy regarding the reasons for Hall's 
request, the court advised Hall he could hire his own attorney but it was not going 
to appoint new counsel because Hall failed to provide any valid basis for doing 
so. (3/9/2011 Tr., p.5, L.18 - p.7, L.17.) The court then proceeded to the 
evidentiary hearing after which it found Hall violated three conditions of his 
probation. (3/9/2011 Tr., pp.10-48; R., p.243.) Following a disposition hearing, 
the court revoked Hall's probation and ordered his sentence executed. (R., 
pp.244-248; see generally 3/21/2011 Tr.) Hall filed a Rule 35 motion (R., pp.249-
251 ), which the court denied (R., pp.273-275). 
Hall filed a notice of appeal timely from the court's order revoking 
probation. (R., pp.256-258.) 
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ISSUES 
Hall states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when the court failed to conduct a 
sufficient inquiry of Mr. Hall and his trial counsel upon Mr. Hall's 
request for appointment of substitute counsel for his probation 
revocation proceedings, and in failing to appoint substitute counsel 
for Mr. Hall? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when the court 
denied Mr. Hall's Rule 35 motion seeking lenience in sentencing 
following the revocation of Mr. Hall's probation? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Hall failed to establish that the district court's inquiry into his request 
for substitute counsel was inadequate or that the court erred by denying his 
request for new counsel? 
2. Has Hall failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in 




Hall Has Failed To Establish The District Court's Inquiry Into His Request For 
Substitute Counsel Was Inadequate Or That The District Court Erred In Denying 
The Request 
A Introduction 
Hall claims the district court erred by failing to adequately inquire into his 
request for substitute counsel. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Hall alternatively argues 
that even if the Court finds the district court's inquiry sufficient, the district court 
erred in failing to appoint substitute counsel. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Both of 
Hall's claims fail. 
B. Stand a rd Of Review 
The decision whether to appoint substitute counsel is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Lippert, 2012 WL 1330947 *2 (Ct. App. 2012). 
C. Hall Had A Full And Fair Opportunity To Present The Reasons For His 
Request For Substitute Counsel 
An indigent defendant has a constitutional right to counsel during 
probation revocation proceedings. State v. King, 131 Idaho 374, 376, 957 P.2d 
352, 354 (Ct. App. 1998). "[F]or good cause a trial court may, in its discretion, 
appoint a substitute attorney for an indigent defendant." Lippert at *2 (citations 
omitted); I.C. § 19-856. When a defendant requests substitute counsel, the court 
"must afford [him] a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons in 
support of a motion for substitution of counsel after having been made aware of 
the problems involved." kt The court's inquiry must include "some reasonable, 
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nonsuggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's complaints" and 
the court must "apprise itself of the facts necessary to determine whether the 
defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the 
point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that his 
or her Sixth Amendment right would be violated but for substitution." kl 
Hall asserts "the trial court erred when [it] failed to conduct a full and fair 
hearing, as required by law, upon his request for substitute counsel .... " 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) The specific inadequacies in the court's inquiry Hall 
asserts on appeal are the court's failure to ask trial counsel about Hall's concerns 
and the court's response to Hall's complaints about counsel. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.7-11.) The court's duty to afford Hall a full and fair opportunity to present the 
reasons for his request for substitute counsel does not, however, include an 
obligation to ask for trial counsel's opinion on the motion, nor are the court's 
comments in response to Hall's request relevant to the adequacy of Hall's 
opportunity to present his reasons. 
As soon as Hall advised the court that he wanted new counsel, the court 
inquired as to the reasons for the request and gave Hall the opportunity to state 
his reasons on the record. Hall does not explain why, or cite any authority for the 
proposition that, trial counsel's input was necessary to complete Hall's own 
opportunity to air his complaints to the court. The law only requires the court to 
"afford the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons 
in support of a motion for substitution of counsel." Lippert, 2012 WL 1330947 *2. 
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It does not require the court to give trial counsel the opportunity to rebut the 
defendant's arguments. Hall's contrary assertion lacks merit. 
Hall also contends the district court's inquiry was insufficient because, 
after he advised the court of his concerns with counsel's representation, "the 
district court merely disregarded [his] allegations by telling him that he could 
always hire a private lawyer if he so wished and that, 'that's kind of the way this 
works."' (Appellant's Brief, p.10 (citing 3/9/2011 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.5).) While 
the court's response may be relevant to Hall's argument that the court erred in 
denying his request, it is not relevant to whether he had a full and fair opportunity 
to present his complaints to the court. Hall's reliance on the Idaho Supreme 
Court's opinion in State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 52 P.3d 857 (2002), does not 
support a contrary conclusion. 
In Nath, the defendant "submitted a pro se motion for substitute counsel" 
in which he "named four witnesses that his court-appointed attorney had not 
interviewed and also mentioned five documents that he thought the attorney 
should have obtained." 137 Idaho at 714, 52 P.3d at 859. "Nath was not allowed 
to speak on the subject" of his motion. ~ at 715, 52 P.3d at 860. The Court, 
after noting the district court's "obligation to afford a defendant a full and fair 
opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for 
substitution of counsel," concluded the district court failed to satisfy this obligation 
because Nath "was not given the opportunity to explain his problems, and the 
[court's] review of his motion did not encompass the totality of his claims." ~ 
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Unlike in Nath, the trial court in this case gave Hall the "opportunity to 
explain his problems." Hall has failed to establish the opportunity afforded him 
was inadequate. 
D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Hall's Request 
For Substitute Counsel 
Hall also contends that the district court erred in denying his request for 
substitute counsel, arguing he established good cause for substitution. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-15.) Application of the relevant law to the reasons for 
Hall's request reveals otherwise. 
Good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel "includes an actual 
conflict of interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication; or an 
irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict." Lippert, 2012 
WL 1330947 *2. It appears Hall believes he was entitled to the appointment of 
substitute counsel based upon an "irrevocable breakdown in communication" 
because of counsel's alleged failure to meet with him prior to the March 9 
evidentiary hearing on the alleged probation violations. (Appellant's Brief, p.12-
13.) Hall's own representations at that hearing contradict this assertion. While 
Hall advised the court that counsel had not been to see him and had not 
answered his calls, he also represented that he did speak with counsel when he 
appeared in court "on the misdemeanor." (3/9/2011 Tr., p.6, Ls.6-10.) At that 
time, he told counsel he wanted her to move to continue the probation violation 
evidentiary hearing, which, according to Hall, she agreed to do. (3/9/2011 Tr., 
p.6, Ls.11-15.) Hall also told the court that counsel failed to "collect[] any of the 
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evidence [he] asked her to" collect. (3/9/2011 Tr., p.5, Ls.16-17.) Thus, it is 
clear from Hall's own statements that he in fact had some communication with 
counsel prior to the evidentiary hearing. That counsel did not interact with Hall 
as much as he would have liked does not demonstrate an "irrevocable 
breakdown in communication."1 See Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1326 (9th 
Cir. 1994) ("there is no constitutional right to a particular degree of preparation for 
trial"); United States v. Olson, 846 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1988) ("We know of 
no case establishing a minimum number of meetings between counsel and client 
prior to trial necessary to prepare an attorney to provide effective assistance of 
counsel."). Nor does counsel's failure to file a motion to continue the probation 
demonstrate good cause. The good cause standard for the appointment of 
substitute counsel is not satisfied simply because appointed counsel refuses to 
pursue motions merely because the client asks counsel to do so. See State v. 
1 On a related point, Hall argues that the district court erred by responding to 
Hall's complaints about the frequency of his interaction with counsel by stating, 
"that's kind of the way this works." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) According to Hall, 
"[t]his aspect of the court's determination is inconsistent with the legal standards 
attendant to the district court's discretion" because, he argues, "[t]he existence of 
systematic failures of appointed counsel to consult with his or her clients does 
not excuse the obligations of counsel imposed by the constitutions of the United 
States and the State of Idaho." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) This argument ignores 
both the context in which the court made the statement and presupposes 
counsel's performance was constitutionally inadequate. The court's comment 
that, "that's kind of the way this works," followed the statement, "It may not be 
that the exact schedule that you wish you had in terms of how much contact you 
have with your lawyer." (3/9/2011 Tr., p.6, L.24 - p.7, L.5.) It was not improper 
for the court to essentially put Hall on notice that his attorney was not required to 
accommodate his "exact schedule." Further, Hall's presupposition that counsel's 
level of interaction with him was constitutionally inadequate is also unsupported 
by any evidence. Hall implicitly acknowledges as much by his footnote reserving 
the right to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel through a post-
conviction petition. (Appellant's Brief, p.11 n.3.) 
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Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 336, 193 P.3d 878, 883 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Notably, the 
right to counsel does not necessarily mean a right to the attorney of one's choice, 
and mere lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel is not necessarily 
grounds for substitute counsel in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.") 
(citations omitted); Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. 
App. 2007) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)) ("An indigent 
defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed appellate 
counsel to press all nonfrivolous arguments that the defendant wishes to 
pursue."). 
One additional factor is worth noting with respect to Hall's claim that he 
was entitled to substitute counsel at the time of his probation evidentiary hearing. 
As noted by the district court in response to Hall's request for new counsel, Hall 
was previously represented by court-appointed counsel, Kelly Whiting, and was 
"unhappy with his representation" as well. (3/9/2011 Tr., p.7, Ls.9-12.) For 
reasons that are not clear in the record, on February 16, 2011, the court 
appointed Virginia Bond to replace Kelly Whiting as Hall's attorney. (R., Vol. I, 
p.234.) It is hardly surprising that Ms. Bond was unable to meet with Hall beyond 
the meeting they had in court when Hall told her he wanted her to file a motion to 
continue in the short timeframe between her appointment on February 16, 2011, 
and the March 9, 2011 probation evidentiary hearing where Hall requested yet 
another attorney. Hall's claim that he was entitled to new counsel based upon an 
"irrevocable breakdown in communication" on the circumstances present in this 
case fails. This is especially true given Hall's failure to highlight any actual 
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deficiency in Ms. Bond's representation at the March 9 hearing or anytime 
thereafter. See Lippert at *4 (rejecting claim of entitlement to substitute counsel 
and noting actions counsel took in representing defendant). 
Because Hall has failed to establish error in either the court's inquiry into 
his request for substitute counsel, or in the court's decision not to appoint 
counsel, Hall has failed to establish he is entitled to reversal of his judgment. 
II. 
Hall Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Hall asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion. A review of the record shows Hall failed to provide the district court with 
any new information that would warrant a reduction of his sentence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether to reduce a sentence following the revocation of probation is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 
P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial 
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Hall must "show that the 
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sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." ~ 
Hall asserts the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 
motion, arguing that he presented new information that would warrant relief and 
that "a review of the entire record in this case demonstrates . . . his overall 
rehabilitative potential." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Both of these arguments lack 
merit. 
The information Hall characterizes as "new" is his "willingness to submit to 
additional supervision and oversight of his activities through GPS monitoring if 
placed back on probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) A "willingness" to be 
monitored while on probation is not "new." Hall's request to be placed back on 
probation implied a "willingness" to be subject to whatever terms and conditions 
the court deemed appropriate, including a "willingness" to be monitored, which is 
the purpose of probation in the first place. That Hall later advised the court that 
he would be "willing" to be monitored in a particular fashion is surely not the type 
of "new" information contemplated by Rule 35. 
Hall's second argument is predicated on an erroneous understanding of 
the law and a factual basis that is belied by the record. With respect to the 
former, Hall, relying on Hanington, supra, contends this Court's review of the 
district court's order denying his Rule 35 motion "encompass[es] events before 
and after the original judgment" including a revie~ of "the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) The state 
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submits this argument reflects an unwarranted expansion of Hanington. While it 
is true that Hanington allows for a broad scope of review when a district court 
revokes a defendant's probation and imposes sentence, where, as here, the 
defendant challenges a specific decision that was based on a specific argument, 
appellate review should be limited accordingly. Thus, it is the state's position that 
because Hall's specific claim on appeal is that the district court erred in denying 
his Rule 35 motion, which was based solely on Hall's willingness to "agree to 
GPS monitoring if [he] could be placed on probation to work" (R., p.249; also 
(p.250 (requesting "leniency in his case for the above stated reasons," i.e., the 
willingness to agree to GPS monitoring)), this Court should only evaluate whether 
the district court abused its discretion in rejecting this request and conclude that it 
did not for the reasons stated above. 
Even if this Court considers the entirety of the record in determining 
whether the court abused its discretion by denying Hall's Rule 35 motion, Hall's 
claim that he has "rehabilitative potential" is belied by the record. Hall correctly 
notes that during his stint in the retained jurisdiction program, it was reported that 
his efforts "should prove to be beneficial" after leaving the facility and that he 
received a recommendation of probation. (Appellant's Brief, p.18 (quoting APSI, 
p.3).) Hall, however, ignores the fact that NICl's probation recommendation was 
a reluctant one. As noted in the APSI: 
I still have concern, because [Hall) has demonstrated a limited 
amount of progress and has demonstrated that he will only accept 
feedback from both me and his peers in a very reluctant manner. 
Overall, his progress at NICI has been mediocre at best and he will 
most definitely pose a challenge to whoever supervises him in the 
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community, but mediocre progress is still change in the right 
direction. 
(APSI, pp.4-5.) 
Hall also ignores the fact that the court followed the probation 
recommendation only to have Hall violate again within a month. As predicted, 
Hall "pose[d] a challenge" after being given another chance at probation. The 
district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Hall's Rule 35 request for yet 
another opportunity on probation. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order revoking Hall's probation and ordering his sentence executed and the 
district court's order denying Rule 35 relief. 
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